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Abstract 
 
 
Audits are an important legal accountability tool used by resource providers (donors, 
grantors, and others) to assure that resources are spent by nonprofit organizations in accordance 
with the resource provider’s intentions.  This paper reports on audits that are required by the 
government of the United States for organizations receiving large amounts of federal financial 
assistance.  Since 1990, nonprofits receiving substantial federal funds are required to undergo 
this rigorous and expensive form of federal oversight.  We report on 11,841 nonprofit entities 
that underwent such audits, and the 3,592 audit firms that conducted them, from 1997 to 1999.  
Overall, compliance with federal regulations appears to be high. Our study indicates that smaller 
nonprofits, those that are new to government grants, and those with prior audit findings have a 
significantly higher rate of adverse audit findings. Perhaps for cost or other reasons, these 
nonprofits are being audited by less experienced auditors. Current federal funding does not 
provide any additional funds for Single Audit Act compliance.  One policy implication of our 
work might be to provide federal funding specifically for Single Audit Act compliance to these 
nonprofits. 
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The Single Audit Act:  
How Compliant are Nonprofit Organizations? 
 
by 
Elizabeth K. Keating, Teresa P. Gordon, Mary Fischer, & Janet Greenlee 
 
INTRODUCTION 
Nonprofit accountability has been thrust on to the public agenda by a series of financial 
scandals, revelations of excessive compensation, and concerns over unethical behavior. Lapses in 
accountability have affected nonprofit organizations as varied as the United Way of America 
(Murawski 1995), Adelphi University (Thornburg 1997), and the NAACP (Greene 1995).  In 
response to increasing public concern, Congress has instituted measures designed to increase 
accountability and oversight in this sector.1  However, little attention has focused on the impact 
of these measures.  The particular measure examined in this paper is the effectiveness of a long-
standing form of oversight, the Single Audit Act (SAA). Single audits were mandated by 
Congress to improve financial management of the over $100 billion in annual federal assistance 
through a uniform set of auditing requirements for federal grants.   
Effective January 1, 1990, most nonprofit organizations receiving government funding 
became subject to the SAA and its associated regulations as promulgated in OMB Circular A-
133: Audits of States, Local Governments, and Nonprofit Organizations.  Since 1996, any 
nonprofit entity expending at least $300,000 in federal funds in any one year must undergo an 
annual A-133 audit.  Each A-133 audit consists of a traditional audit conducted by a licensed 
certified public accountant (CPA), an assessment of the internal control structure, and procedures 
that assess the use of federal funds and compliance with certain laws and regulations.  Since an 
A-133 audit demands skills beyond those necessary for a standard CPA audit, auditors are 
required to obtain specialized training and expertise.  Overall, A-133 audits are a highly rigorous 
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form of nonprofit oversight, which is expensive and challenging for both the auditor and the 
auditee. 
Kearns (1996, 9) describes nonprofit accountability, in part, as that “wide spectrum of 
public expectations dealing with organizational performance, responsiveness . . . of nonprofit 
organizations.” Under the Kearns framework, single audits would be categorized as a 
compliance-type of accountability designed to fulfill legal and regulatory requirements. They are 
externally imposed by a higher authority and implemented through explicit standards. Several 
researchers have questioned the effectiveness of the monitoring and enforcement of other forms 
of legal accountability imposed upon nonprofit organizations (Chisholm 1995, Brody 2002) but 
did not address the implementation of the Single Audit Act. According to Kearns, nonprofit 
organizations make strategic and tactical decisions to respond to the accountability system. 
Our study is designed to empirically examine nonprofit organizations’ response to legal 
accountability requirements imposed by the Single Audit Act. Anecdotally, we observe that 
some nonprofit organizations, such as Tuskegee University, have lost government funding due to 
adverse audit findings arising from its A-133 audit (Tuskegee 1998). This loss of funding for 
Tuskegee resulted in significant declines in service provision and weakened the financial health 
of the university. McKenzie College, established in 1885, went of out business in 1992 when it 
lost both government financial aid funding and accreditation (HED 1993). These potentially 
unfavorable outcomes from noncompliance with the Single Audit Act suggest that nonprofits 
may make strategic and tactical decisions to comply, in fact and/or appearance, with the A-133 
requirements. We examine two research questions that are indicative of these decisions: 
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1. Nonprofits can select from a large pool of potential auditors who may vary in their level 
of experience. Are nonprofits choosing audit firms with extensive general and/or 
specialized A-133 audit experience? 
2. Nonprofits can undertake measures to reduce the likelihood of adverse audit findings. 
What is the likelihood that a nonprofit is found to be out of compliance with the A-133 
requirements? Are particular characteristics (such as, industry subsector, organizational 
size, experience with federal grants or auditor’s experience) factors that effect the 
likelihood of an adverse finding?  
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Information about the requirements 
of the Single Audit Act is provided in Section II, followed by a review of empirical research on 
A-133 audits in Section III.  The sample and methodology are presented in Section IV.  Results 
and discussion of findings conclude the paper in Sections V and VI, respectively. 
BACKGROUND ON THE SINGLE AUDIT ACT 
History Of The Single Audit Act2 
The General Accounting Office (GAO) became concerned over the laxity of internal 
controls of organizations receiving federal funds that surfaced in the 1970s (GAO 1986a, 1986b, 
1989).  These concerns led to the issuance of uniform audit requirements embodied in the Office 
of Management and Budget (OMB) Circulars A-110 for certain nonprofit organizations and A-
102 for state and local governments.  Unfortunately, the guidance was not effectively 
implemented (Gross et al. 2000) and resulted in federal agencies requiring recipient 
organizations to have audits conducted on each separate grant or contract. The Single Audit Act 
(SAA) of 1984 was adopted to improve audit efficiency and reduce audit costs through uniform 
audit requirements that eliminated these duplicate audit processes. The issuance of OMB 
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Circular A-133 in 1990 expanded the coverage to federally-funded nonprofit organizations as 
well. Currently, recipients of federal financial assistance that expend $300,000 or more in federal 
awards during a fiscal year are required to undergo a single audit for that fiscal year. 
Organizations receiving less than the $300,000 threshold amount must still keep adequate 
accounting records and make them available for inspection and audit upon request.   
Prior Empirical Studies of the Single Audit Act 
The academic research on single audits can be grouped into four areas: impact on auditee 
compliance, quality of the audit work, auditor selection, and frequency of adverse findings. 
Although all of the studies have focused on single audits of governmental entities, the findings 
may be generalizable to nonprofit organizations.  
 The findings of studies examining the impact of the SAA on auditee compliance have 
been somewhat mixed. Engstrom (1992) reported that CPAs (but not their municipal clients) 
believe that audits were more effective and efficient under the SAA and that single audits had 
improved over time.  However, neither group believed that the SAA had resulted in more 
effective or efficient use of federal funds.  In contrast, Brannan (1993) found that auditors 
believe that the SAA had improved recipient compliance with applicable federal rules and 
regulations.  Overall, however, both papers suggest some improvement in the level of 
compliance by organizations receiving government funding.  
The literature examining the quality of work done by auditors examining governmental 
entities is extensive (see, for example, Marks and Raman 1986; Hardiman, Squires and Smith 
1987; Palmrose 1988; Roberts, Glezen and Jones 1990; Raman and Wallace 1994; Deis and 
Giroux 1992; Lawrence 1999). Studies of single audits began when GAO reports criticized the 
quality of audits of governmental entities conducted by certified public accounting firms (GAO 
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1986a, 1986b, 1989).  The 1986 GAO report indicated that as many as one-third of all audits of 
recipients of federal financial assistance failed to conform to professional standards. Using the 
GAO data, Copley and Doucet (1993) found a positive relationship between fixed fee 
arrangements and single audits deemed substandard, suggesting that audit quality suffers when 
the auditor has an incentive to limit the amount of audit testing to assure the engagement remains 
profitable.  Brown and Raghunandan (1995 and 1997) found little improvement in the quality of 
governmental audits since the original 1986 GAO report despite government standards (known 
as the “Yellow Book”) that require government-specific continuing education for auditors 
conducting single audits and increased use of quality reviews. The President’s Council on 
Integrity and Efficiency found that 34 percent of A-133 audits of governmental entities report 
some significant shortcoming in the audit work performed (Broadus and Comtois 1987).  
Auditor selection in the nonprofit sector was studied by Krishman and Schauer (2000) 
through an examination of the quality of United Way operating agency audits (A-133 audits were 
not separately analyzed). They found that the extent of noncompliance decreased as audit firm 
size increased (2000, p. 17). Other researchers have examined the role of audit fees in auditor 
selection. The audit fee research hypothesizes that the Single Audit Act has increased auditing 
fees due to additional audit procedures, more potential liability, and requirements that auditors 
receive supplemental audit training.  However, this increase in costs might be offset by reducing 
the number of audits conducted and/or enhancing auditor efficiency.  One notable study (Raman 
and Wilson 1992) provides evidence indicating no significant gains in auditor efficiency.  They 
also found that independent accounting firms absorbed the incremental costs associated with the 
SAA rather than passing them along to their municipal clients.  
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Finally, some researchers have focused on the frequency of adverse findings. In 
particular, Jakubowski (1995) looked at which auditors conducted A-133 audits and the 
frequency of audit findings for governmental entities. He found that state auditors conducting A-
133 audits report more internal control weaknesses than do private audit firms. In addition when 
the frequency of reported internal control weaknesses during the first four years of single audits 
was examined, he found significant differences between cities and counties.  In the first year of 
the SAA, an average of 2.8 material internal control weaknesses were found in counties and 1.8 
in cities.  By the third and fourth years of the SAA, the number of reported material internal 
control weaknesses had fallen by 42 percent for cities, but only by 13 percent for counties.  As a 
result, Jakubowski concluded that county governments made few changes in their control 
structures while municipal governments made significant improvements.  This confirms earlier 
findings by Coe and Ellis (1991) that improper acts were more common in county government 
than in municipalities.  
SAMPLE AND METHODOLOGY 
Sample Selection 
While Jakubowski studied governmental entities, our investigation focuses on nonprofit 
organizations. Our data set is derived from A-133 audit information available from the Federal 
Audit Clearinghouse and Form 990 IRS tax data available from the National Center for 
Charitable Statistics (NCCS).  The A-133 database provides data collected from auditors 
conducting the single audits and includes the auditee, auditor, cognizant or oversight federal 
agency, total awards amount, and audit findings. After our efforts to eliminate incomplete and 
duplicate data and standardize spelling of audit firm names, the resulting data set includes 83,708 
single audits of both nonprofit and governmental organizations conducted from 1997 through 
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2000. We combined the single audit act data with the IRS Business Master File using the 
employer identification number (EIN). From this we identified 37,540 audit reports representing 
17,363 nonprofit organizations. We then matched the dataset to the NCCS 1999 “core file” using 
name and audit year.3 The core file covers one year of tax filings and contains 228,011 nonprofit 
organizations for 125 variables, including descriptive information and financial variables from 
the IRS Return Transaction Files after they have been cleaned4 by NCCS. Some nonprofits in the 
resulting sample reported multiple 990 filings under different EINs. Due to the uncertainty 
associated with determining which EIN represented the main entity, these organizations were 
excluded. The final sample includes audit findings and financial information on 11,841 nonprofit 
organizations and 12,654 audit reports covering periods ending between June 30, 1997 and 
August 31, 1999.  
Descriptive Statistics 
The nonprofit sector is quite diverse. For descriptive purposes, we partitioned the 
database into the five largest industry sectors based on the National Taxonomy of Exempt 
Entities (NTEE):  arts, education, health, human services, and public or societal benefit.  All 
other nonprofit organizations (environmental, international and foreign affairs, 
mutual/membership benefit, etc.) are included in the “Other NPOs” column in Table 1. The 
majority (54.1 percent) of nonprofit organizations (NPOs) undergoing single audits during this 
period were human service entities. Health and educational organizations accounted for 19.3 
percent and 13.7 percent of the audits, respectively. In contrast, only 210 arts, culture and 
humanities organizations (less than two percent of the audits) expended enough federal funds to 
be covered by the SAA.    
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Although human service agencies represented the majority of single audits, their average 
total assets ($4.1 million) and total revenues ($3.7 million) were substantially smaller than the 
other sectors. In contrast, the health and education sectors had the most assets ($33.3 and $139.0 
million, respectively) and revenues ($31.9 and $54.0 million, respectively). Educational 
organizations, on average, expended the most federal awards annually ($16.9 million), probably 
due to the inclusion of financial aid and educational loans to students.  Arts organizations, at the 
other extreme, expended the least federal award amounts ($1.6 million).  Note that medians for 
the dollar figures in Table 1 were often dramatically different than the averages indicating wide 
variability in organizational size and award amounts – particularly for the education sector. 
To assess the relative financial health of these organizations, we computed two ratios, 
financial leverage (debt/assets) and the surplus margin (net income/total revenue). While the 
sectors differ based on average assets, liabilities, revenues, and expenses, these differences were 
accentuated when examining the ratios. The average financial leverage for the entire sample was 
56.5 percent, yet only 34.9 and 35.2 percent of art and educational organizations’ assets, 
respectively, were financed through debt. In contrast, human services agencies relied on debt to 
finance 66.7 percent of their assets.  Arts organizations reported the highest mean surplus margin 
(16.2 percent). Human service agencies have the lowest mean and median surplus margin (0.4 
percent for both measures).  
RESULTS OF ANALYSIS 
Nonprofit Organizations’ Audit Firm Selection 
In Table 2, we examine which audit firms were selected by nonprofit organizations to 
conduct single audits of nonprofit organizations. During the three-year period under 
examination, 3,592 audit firms conducted 12,654 A-133 nonprofit audits for 11,841 separate 
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NPO clients, an overall average of 3.5 NPO audits per firm during the period.  The mean per 
audit firm was 23 for A-133 audits during the period. We divided the firms into four 
classifications that correspond to general and/or specialized A-133 audit experience: 
1. Big-5:  the five largest international public accounting and auditing firms5.  These firms 
audit most of the large publicly traded corporations in the United States and have offices 
in all of the largest cities and many smaller cities. 
 
2. Regional:  the next 25 largest public accounting firms in the United States based on 
revenue reported to Accounting Today.6 Of these 25, only 15 firms reported conducting 
A-133 audits in the Census Bureau dataset.  
 
3. Specialist:  those firms that are neither “Big-5” nor “Regional” but conducted 30 or more 
A-133 audits of both governmental and nonprofit entities over the sample period. 
 
4. Other:  those smaller audit firms not included in the previous groups and a few 
government auditors.7 
As Table 2 indicates, larger nonprofit organizations tend to hire the Big-5 firms, which is 
not surprising since these auditors are the firms that typically audit the largest business 
enterprises in the for-profit sector.  Nonprofit organizations with higher mean and median total 
assets, total revenues, total expenses, and federal awards expended were significantly more likely 
to select these firms.  Although each Big-5 firm performed an average of 303 nonprofit A-133 
audits, this represented only 12 percent of the total number of A-133 audits conducted. In 
contrast, the 15 regional firms completed an average of 50 nonprofit A-133 audits  (6 percent of 
audits), while 411 specialist firms conducted an average of 10 nonprofit A-133 audits (30 percent 
of audits) during the study period.  The remaining firms performed the majority of the NPO 
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single audits, but averaged only 2.0 NPO audits during the entire study period. The smallest 
nonprofit organizations (in terms of mean and median total assets, total revenues, total expenses 
and federal awards expended) tended to use these small, non-specialist audit firms. This auditor 
group was selected by a disproportionately high number of human services organizations and a 
disproportionately low number of educational organizations. In contrast, the Big-5 firms 
performed 34 percent of the A-133 audits of educational institutions and a disproportionately 
high percentage of the arts organizations (22 percent). 
Frequency of Adverse Audit Findings 
1. Overview 
When completing a single audit, the auditor must produce numerous reports. First, the 
auditor reports whether the financial statements were in conformity with generally accepted 
accounting principles (GAAP) and the schedule of Federal award expenditures were fairly 
presented in all material respects (financial statement opinion). The opinion8 can be unqualified 
or “clean,” qualified, adverse or a disclaimer of opinion. The audit opinion may also contain 
language that questions whether the nonprofit can continue to operate as a going concern. 
Second, the auditor must provide an opinion on whether the major programs are in material 
compliance with laws, regulations, and the provisions of contract or grant agreements (material 
compliance opinion). Since the auditee may have multiple programs, the opinion can be mixed, 
where some programs receive an unqualified opinion, and others receive qualified or adverse 
opinions or disclaimers of opinion. Third, a schedule of any reportable conditions in internal 
controls must be filed.9 If a finding is reported, the auditor must indicate whether or not it is a 
material weakness.  Finally, the auditor must indicate if there is any material noncompliance with 
laws, regulations or cost allocations. For each major program, the auditor must also provide an 
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opinion on whether the particular program is in compliance with laws, regulations, and cost 
allocations. If the auditor observes a failure by the auditee to comply, then the audit firm issues 
an adverse finding.  
Overall, 95.8 percent of the financial statement opinions were unqualified (Table 3). Of 
the 529 financial statement opinions that were not unqualified, the majority (95.7 percent) was 
qualified, indicating some limitation of the audit, such as the inability to gather certain 
information or the use of a nonstandard accounting practice that affected some aspect of the 
financial statements. Public/societal benefit organizations were more likely to receive a qualified 
opinion (6.0 percent as compared to 4.0 percent overall), while arts organizations were the least 
likely to receive a qualified opinion (1.9 percent). Just over one percent (136) of the financial 
statement opinions questioned the organization’s ability to continue in existence (going concern).  
Arts organizations had the lowest (0.5 percent), while health care had the highest rate of going 
concern disclosures (1.6 percent). Interestingly, more than 75 percent of these “going concern” 
nonprofits received an unqualified financial statement audit opinion. 
A reportable condition was disclosed in 15.7 percent of the single audits and 29.1 percent 
of these conditions were considered to be a material weakness in internal control.  Health care 
organizations had the highest rate of reportable conditions and human service organizations had 
the lowest. Reportable conditions that were considered to be a material weakness were reported 
at the highest rate for public or societal benefit organizations, with 6.9 percent of all audit 
reports. This was over 40 percent of the reportable conditions in the public and societal benefit 
organizations. Arts organizations reported the fewest, with only 2.4 percent of all audit reports. 
Arts had the lowest rate of material weaknesses at 16.7 percent (5 material weaknesses out of 30 
audits with reportable conditions). 
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When looking at contract and legal compliance, auditors disclosed that only 3.0 percent 
of nonprofits were not in material compliance, and this finding was not affected by nonprofit 
industry sector. Most nonprofit organizations (95.0 percent) received unqualified opinions on all 
their major programs. Disclaimers of opinion comprised the bulk of the remaining reports. Other 
and educational organizations received the highest rates of disclaimers of opinion (6.8 and 6.5 
percent respectively, compared to 4.9 percent overall); arts institutions had the lowest disclaimer 
rate (3.3 percent). 
2. Low vs. Not Low-Risk Auditees 
The extent of a nonprofit’s audit under SAA is determined by a risk-based approach that 
considers current and prior audit experience, the amount of funding, and nature of the federal 
program.  Each federal award is categorized as either Type A (major) or Type B (minor) based 
on the size of the grant. Some programs are then identified as either low risk or not low risk 
using various criteria.10 Finally, certain nonprofits can gain low-risk auditee status by having 
single audits in the past two years in which the financial statements were unqualified with no 
reported material weaknesses in internal controls or legal compliance problems. Hence, a 
nonprofit that is inexperienced with government grants will not receive low-risk status and will 
be subject to a more stringent set of audit procedures. 
Once the auditor has determined the status of the programs and the auditee, the auditor 
must audit as a “major program” all high risk Type A programs, at least half of low-risk Type A 
programs, and at least half of high risk Type B programs. For many nonprofits, the auditor must 
expand the audit scope to ensure that the audited programs encompass at least 50 percent of all 
federal award money expended by the recipient. In addition, each Type A program must be 
audited at least once every three years as a major program, regardless of risk classification. 
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Nonprofits that do not obtain low-risk status are ex ante deemed more likely to be noncompliant. 
By virtue of being subject to more extensive audit procedures, these organizations have a higher 
probability of being found noncompliant ex post. 
In our sample, 58 percent of the audits were classified as low-risk. Table 4 shows the rate 
at which nonprofit organizations met the A-133 criteria for classification as low risk auditees and 
the effect of this classification on the rate at which adverse audit findings were reported.  The 
classification varied significantly by industry sub-sector. Educational and arts institutions had the 
highest percentage of low-risk auditees (63.4 and 61.1 percent, respectively, as compared to 58 
percent overall). Other and public/societal benefit organizations were less likely to be classified 
as low-risk auditees (51.8 and 54.1 percent, respectively).  Low-risk auditees were much less 
likely to have qualified audit opinions (2.4 percent versus 6.2 percent for other than low-risk 
auditees). The auditees with low risk status were three times less likely to receive going concern 
language (0.6 percent to 1.7 percent for their higher risk counterparts). The low-risk auditees 
were also less likely to have reportable conditions (9.1 percent to 24.8 percent for those without 
low-risk status).  Note that the reportable conditions were less often material for the low-risk 
entities (11.2 percent) than for the other auditees (38.3 percent).  Material noncompliance was 
also significantly less likely for low risk auditees. 
3. The Role of Auditor Selection 
Table 5 shows the effect of auditor type on the disclosure of adverse audit findings. Big-5 
firms were the most likely to have clients classified as low-risk auditees (63.5 percent), and they 
were also the most likely to render a clean opinion on the financial statements (98.2 percent 
versus 95.8 percent overall). Their clients were also among the least likely to have going concern 
language (0.7 percent to 1.1 percent overall), reportable conditions (4.4 percent to 15.7 percent 
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overall), and reportable conditions considered material weaknesses (22.4 percent to 29.3 percent 
overall). In contrast, the large regional firms disclosed reportable conditions in internal controls 
at a disproportionately higher rate (21.6 percent) and were the most likely type of firm to include 
going concern language in their financial statement opinions (1.33 percent). Specialist auditors 
audited a disproportionately higher percentage of higher risk clients and were substantially more 
likely to conduct a program-specific audit (5.3 percent of all specialist audits as compared to 3.2 
percent overall). While nonprofits that did not receive low-risk status were on a percentage basis, 
more likely to select a specialist auditor, numerically most of these organizations selected the 
small, non-specialist audit firms. Despite the relative lack of experience in conducting A-133 
audits, these small non-specialist audit firms were more likely to issue financial statements that 
were qualified (4.8 percent to 4.0 percent overall) and reportable conditions that were material 
weaknesses (30.0 percent to 29.3 percent overall). 
4. The Role of Organizational and Grant Size 
Finally, we examined the relation between audit findings and federal grant size and 
nonprofit organization size as measured by total revenues.  Table 6 splits the sample at the 
median for each of the size-related measures.  Large organizations or those expending large 
grants were more likely to be classified as low risk.  Interestingly, organizations with smaller 
federal grants received significantly more clean opinions than those with large grants (96.2 
percent versus 95.4 percent). Similarly, organizations with lower revenues received significantly 
more clean opinions (96.7 versus 94.9 percent). Smaller engagements (under both measurement 
criteria) more frequently received opinions containing going concern language, had 
proportionally more reportable conditions, and the reportable conditions were more likely to be 
 15
considered material. In addition, the auditors more often reported material noncompliance with 
legal and program requirements.  
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS 
Audits are an important legal accountability tool used by resource providers (donors, 
grantors, and others) to assure that resources are spent by nonprofit organizations in accordance 
with the resource provider’s intentions.  This paper reports on audits that are required by the 
government of the United States for organizations receiving large amounts of federal financial 
assistance.  In accordance with the Single Audit Act, these nonprofit organizations must undergo 
an A-133 audit, a rigorous and expensive form of federal oversight.  During the period we 
examined (1997 to 1999), 3,592 audit firms conducted A-133 audits for 11,841 nonprofit 
entities. Overall, compliance with federal regulations appears to be high.  Although the audit 
reports indicated relatively few reportable conditions and even fewer instances of material 
noncompliance, we did observe some variations in audit findings depending on both the type of 
audit firm, the specific industry sub-sector of their clients, size of the organization, federal award 
amount, and risk classification. 
Our study indicates that smaller nonprofits and those who are not classified as low-risk 
have a significantly higher rate of adverse audit findings. This suggests that small organizations, 
those with less experience with federal funding or with audit findings in prior years have the 
greatest difficulty complying with the Single Audit Act.  Perhaps, due to cost or other factors, 
these organizations more frequently select specialist or small, non-specialist auditors rather than 
the Big 5 or regional audit firms. Hence, the nonprofits that may need more assistance to comply 
are obtaining advice and being audited by the less experienced auditors. Overall, these findings 
indicate that these organizations, in particular, need assistance to comply with the Single Audit 
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Act. Current federal funding does not provide any additional funds for Single Audit Act 
compliance.  One policy implication of our work might be to provide federal funding specifically 
for Single Audit Act compliance to these nonprofits.  
We found the arts and education sectors to be similar in several respects, having the most 
assets, the highest profit margins, and the least reliance on debt. Possibly because of these 
attributes, more low-risk audits were identified in these two sectors.  Interestingly, in spite of 
appearing to be in excellent financial health, the education sector tended to have far more 
adverse audit findings than the arts sector.  
The human service and public and societal benefit sectors are similar in terms of asset 
size:  both are small.  However, they differ in almost all other respects.  The human service 
sector, which constitutes the largest number of organizations in our study, appears to be in 
relatively poor financial condition with the smallest surplus margin and the most reliance on 
debt. Organizations in the public and societal benefit sector, on the other hand, appear to be in 
much better financial condition.  They have an above average surplus margin and lower than 
average reliance on debt. The average size of federal awards in public and societal benefit sector 
is, well above average, yet it has a lower than average proportion of organizations falling into the 
low-risk category.  In addition, the public and societal benefit organizations reported the fewest 
unqualified audit opinions on financial statements and the most material weakness in internal 
controls and noncompliance items. In contrast, the human services organizations received on 
average small federal awards (only the arts sector had smaller grants).  They also had close to an 
average percentage of low risk audits.  Finally, their audits resulted in relatively few reportable 
conditions, and their A-133 audits were more likely to result in unqualified opinions.  
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Health care organizations appear from this study to be in poor financial condition as well. 
Although this sector had, on average, the third most assets, only human service organizations 
reported a lower surplus margin.  In addition, they rank third highest in their reliance on debt.  In 
addition, audits of health care organizations resulted in the most reportable conditions and going 
concern issues. 
Unlike for-profit firms, nonprofit organizations do not predominantly select Big-5 audit 
firms. Instead, we found that numerous specialist and small audit firms are selected to conduct 
most of these audits.  Auditees that are smaller and less likely to be classified as low risk tend to 
choose small audit firms. Not surprising given the risks inherent in accepting higher risk clients, 
the small audit firms issued the majority of the qualified audit opinions.  The smaller audit firms 
that conducted less than three single audits of the nonprofit organizations during the period were 
the dominant force in this market. These non-specialist firms accounted for half of the audit 
reports.   
Since little research has been conducted in the nonprofit area, many avenues for further 
research are available.  Different cognizant agencies may require additional or more complex 
reporting requirements.  Thus, an analysis of the type and source of federal awards might shed 
further light on the different audit outcomes.  A majority of the accounting firms conducting 
these complex audits complete, on average, fewer than two per year. An analysis of the quality 
of these audits would be useful.  Since each organization can choose which auditor will perform 
its A-133 audit, an exploration of why an organization chooses a particular audit firm could be 
an important extension of this study.  Public or societal benefit agencies and educational 
institutions were generally more likely to receive adverse audit findings, while the arts 
institutions were relatively less likely.  Again, further research is needed to ascertain why the 
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recipients of federal financial assistance in some sub-sectors appear to have more internal control 
and other adverse audit findings than in other sub-sectors. It may be that the program compliance 
requirements associated with some grants or cognizant agencies may be more stringent than 
those in others.   
 This study only examined nonprofit organizations that underwent a financial audit as part 
of an A-133 audit. The results of these audits are publicly available.  Because the audit findings 
of nonprofits (unlike those of both for-profit and governmental entities) are generally not 
publicly available, we were unable to compare the two groups. Thus, an analysis of the 
differences in attributes (if any) between nonprofits required to undergo A-133 audits and those 
who are not so required, both cross-sectionally and longitudinally, would be a very important 
extension of our study. 
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Table 1 - Descriptive Statistics - Nonprofit Organizations with A-133 Audits for Periods Ending   
between July 31, 1997 and August 31, 1999 
 
NTEE Classification Arts Education Health Human  Services 
Public or  
Societal  
Benefit 
Other  
NPOs 
Total  
Sample 
Number of audit reports filed 211 1,664 2,344 6,968 895 572 12,654 
Number of organizations 210 1,617 2,280 6,403 869 509 11,841 
Percentage of total organizations 1.77% 13.66% 19.26% 54.07% 7.34% 4.30% 100.00% 
Total assets (000s)        
Mean 45,700 139,000* 33,300 4,113* 11,200 13,900 28,900 
Median 3,442* 17,100* 2,147* 1,549* 1,787 1,658 1,909 
Total revenues (000s)        
Mean  18,700 54,000* 31,900* 3,667* 8,502 9,038 16,300 
Median  2,861* 12,800* 3,681* 1,136* 2,140 1,765 1,964 
Total expenses  (000s)        
Mean  14,700 43,500* 30,800* 3,498* 7,784 7,877 14,500 
Median  2,037* 11,600* 3,507* 1,084* 1,962 1,694 1,256 
Leverage (liabilities/assets)        
Mean 34.89%* 35.23%* 47.23%* 66.70%* 46.78%* 54.19% 56.45% 
Median 23.09%* 28.44%* 40.78%* 59.49%* 39.26%* 45.02% 45.48% 
Surplus Margin ((Total Revenues – Total Expenses)/Total Revenues)      
Mean  16.21%* 10.79%* 0.82% 0.44%* 5.24% 2.34% 2.56% 
Median  7.54%* 7.11%* 1.80% 0.41%* 1.95%* 1.42% 1.44% 
Federal awards expended (000s)        
Mean     1,571 16,912* 2,664* 2,359* 5,576 4,207 4,627 
Median  693* 3,303* 902* 1,244* 1,237 1,242 1,256 
 
Note:   Assets, liabilities, revenues and expenses are from the NCCS "Core" files. Federal awards figures are derived from the Federal Audit Clearinghouse. 
* Significantly different from rest of sample at the 1% level (two-tailed test), using t-test for comparison of means and Wilcoxon sign rank test for medians
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Table 2 – A-133 Audits Conducted and Nonprofit Client Characteristics by Type of Auditor 
Type of Auditor Big-5 Audit Firms 
Large Regional 
Firms 
Specialist 
Audit Firms 
All Other 
Auditors Total Sample 
Number of audit firms 5 15 411 3,161 3,592 
Number of NPO A-133 audits conducted 1,513 754 3,940 6,447 12,654 
Number of unique NPO audit clients 1,427 722 3,629 6,137 11,841 
Mean number of NPO A-133 audits conducted 
per audit firm (1997-1999) 302.6 50.3 9.6 2.0 3.5 
Total Assets (000s)      
Mean 189,000* 18,000 6,682* 6,100* 28,900 
Median 33,000* 3,301* 1,739 1,423* 1,909 
Total Revenues (000s)      
Mean 97,800* 10,400 5,312* 4,651* 16,300 
Median 22,700* 3,538* 1,538* 1,592* 1,964 
Total Expenses (000s)      
Mean 85,100* 9,330 5,013 4,325* 14,500 
Median 19,800* 3,299* 1,488* 1,509* 1,256 
Leverage (Total Liabilities/Total Assets) 
Mean 46.07%* 54.30% 61.70%* 55.92%* 56.45% 
Median 35.33%* 41.87% 54.94%* 44.59%* 45.48% 
Surplus Margin ((Total Revenues – Total Expenses)/Total Revenues) 
Mean 6.05%* 3.52% 0.12%* 3.13% 1.44% 
Median 5.45%* 1.71% 0.38%* 1.53%* 2.56% 
Total Federal Awards Expended by Clients (000s)     
Mean 18,410* 4,774 32,746 2,528* 4,629 
Median 3,321* 1,551* 1,391* 981* 1,256 
Client NTEE Category      
Arts 46 12 52 101 211 
Education 564 141 310 850 1,664 
Health 331 144 616 1,253 2,344 
Human Services 358 381 2,491 3,738 6,968 
Public, Societal Benefit 111 51 283 450 895 
Other Nonprofit Organizations 103 26 188 255 572 
  Total (χ2(15) = 1,172.1, p= 0.00) 1,513 754 3,940 6,447 12,654 
 
* Significantly different from rest of sample at the 1% level (two-tailed test), using t-test for comparison of means and 
Wilcoxon sign rank test for medians.
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Table 3 - Compliance with Single Audit Act  - by Type of Nonprofit Organization 
NTEE Classification Arts Education Health Human Services 
Public or 
Societal 
Benefit 
Other  
NPOs 
Total 
Sample 
Financial Statement Opinion (Organization as a whole)  
Adverse 0 0 1 2 1 0 4 
Disclaimer 0 1 6 10 1 1 19 
Qualified 4 77 76 274 54 21 506 
Unqualified 207 1,586 2,261 6,682 839 550 12,125 
Totala (χ2(5) = 16.1, p=0.01) 211 1,664 2,344 6,968 895 572 12,654 
Going Concern Language in Opinion Letter  
Number of audit reports  1 19 38 63 11 4 136 
 Percentage of sub-sectors' audits 0.47% 1.14% 1.62% 0.90% 1.23% 0.70% 1.07% 
(χ2(5) = 10.2, p=0.07)       
Reportable Condition Disclosed by Auditor  
Number of audit reports  30 287 441 974 152 103 1,987 
 Percentage of audits 14.22% 17.25% 18.81% 13.98% 16.98% 18.01% 15.70% 
(χ2(5) = 39.6, p=0.00       
Reportable Conditions Considered a Material Weakness 
Number of audit reports  5 84 134 267 62 27 579 
 Percentage of audits 2.37% 5.05% 5.72% 3.83% 6.93% 4.72% 4.58% 
 Percentage of reportable conditions 
(χ2(5) = 30.4, p=0.00) 
16.67% 29.27% 30.39% 27.41% 40.79% 26.21% 29.14% 
Material Noncompliance Disclosed by Auditor      
        Number of audit reports 5 52 72 197 35 14 375 
 Percentage of audits 2.37% 3.12% 3.07% 2.83% 3.91% 2.45% 2.96% 
(χ2(5) = 4.3, p=0.51)     
Type of Audit Report on Major Program Compliance     
Adverse 0 5 2 3 0 0 10 
Disclaimer 7 108 108 296 56 39 614 
Qualified 0 1 3 2 2 1 9 
Adverse and Qualified 0 0 1 3 0 0 4 
Disclaimer and Qualified 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 
Unqualified 204 1,550 2,230 6,664 836 532 12,016 
Totala  (χ2(5) = 28.6, p=0.00) 211 1,664 2,346 6,962 895 572 12,654 
 
a  Chi-square test compares unqualified opinions to the total of all other types of opinions. 
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Table 4 - Compliance with the Single Audit Act - Effect of NPO Risk Category 
Audit Risk Category Not Low Risk 
 Low Risk             Total (% Low risk) 
NTEE classification     
Arts, culture and humanities 82  129 211   (61.1%) 
Education 604  1,055 1,664  (63.4%) 
Health care 959  1,385 2,344  (59.1%) 
Human services 2,977  3,991 6,968  (57.3%) 
Public and societal benefit 411  484 895  (54.1%) 
Other 276  296 572  (51.8%) 
Total  (χ2(5) = 38.3, p=0.00) 5,314  7,340 12,654 (58.0%) 
Financial Statement Opinion (Organization as a whole)    
Adverse  3 1 4   (25.0%) 
Disclaimer  17 2 19  (10.5%) 
Qualified  330 176 506  (34.8%) 
Unqualified  4,964 7,161 12,125  (59.1%) 
Totala  (χ2(1) = 132.4, p=0.00) 5,314 7,340 12,654  (58.0%) 
 Going Concern Language in Opinion Letter    
Number of audit reports  91 45 136 
Percentage of audits  1.71% 0.61% 1.07% 
  (χ2(1) = 35.0, p=0.00)  
 
  
 Reportable Condition Disclosed by Auditor      
Number of audit reports  1,316 671 1,987 
Percentage of audits  24.76% 9.14% 15.70% 
  (χ2(1) = 568.4, p=0.00)  
 
  
Reportable Conditions Considered a Material Weakness    
Number of audit reports  504 75 579 
Percentage of reportable conditions  38.30% 11.18% 29.14% 
 (χ2(1) = 505.6, p=0.00)  
   
Material Noncompliance Disclosed by Auditor    
Number of audit reports  283 92 375 
Percentage of audits  5.33% 1.25% 2.96% 
  (χ2(1) = 177.7, p=0.00)     
Type of Audit Report on Major Program Compliance    
Adverse  7 3 10  (30.0%) 
Disclaimer  463 151 613  (24.6%) 
Qualified  4 5 9  (55.6%) 
Adverse and Qualified 4 0 4    (0.0%) 
Disclaimer and Qualified 1 0 1   (0.0%) 
Unqualified  4,835 7,181 12,016  (59.8%) 
Totala  (χ2(1) = 301.9, p=0.00) 5,314 7,340 12,654  (58.0%) 
 
a  Chi-square test compares unqualified opinions to the total of all other types of opinions. 
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Table 5 - Audit Findings by Type of CPA Firm 
Type of Auditor Big-5 Audit Large Specialist All Other Total 
      
Percentage of clients classified as low risk 
auditees (χ23) = 21.9 p=0.00) 63.45% 58.89% 56.93% 57.28% 58.01% 
Type of A-133 Audit Conducted      
Single Audit 1,450 747 3,733 6,324 12,254 
Program Audit 63 7 207 123 400 
(χ2 (3) = 106.7, p=0.00) 1,513 754 3,940 6,447 12,654 
Financial Statement Opinion (Organization as a whole)    
Adverse 0 0 2 2 4 
Disclaimer 3 0 8 8 19 
Qualified 25 21 152 308 506 
Unqualified 1,485 733 3,778 6,129 12,125 
Totala  (χ2 (3) = 33.3, p=0.00) 1,513 754 3,940 6,447 12,654 
Going Concern Language in Opinion Letter     
Number of audits 10 10 37 79 136 
Percentage of audits 0.66% 1.33% 0.94% 1.17% 1.07% 
(χ2 (3) = 4.9, p=0.18)      
Reportable Condition Disclosed by Auditor     
Number of audits 67 163 114 1,641 1985 
Percentage of audits 4.43% 21.62% 12.42% 17.33% 15.68% 
(χ2 (3) = 209.7, p=0.00)      
Reportable Conditions Considered a Material Weakness    
Number of audits 15 41 33 492 581 
Percentage of reportable conditions 22.39% 25.15% 28.95% 29.98% 29.27% 
(χ2(3) = 66.1, p=0.00)      
Material Noncompliance Disclosed by Auditor     
Number of audits 19 9 20 330 378 
Percentage of audits 1.26% 1.19% 2.18% 3.48% 2.99% 
(χ2(3) = 31.3, p=0.00)      
Type of Audit Report on Major Program Compliance    
Adverse 3 0 3 7 10 
Disclaimer 41 19 191 516 613 
Qualified 0 0 3 9 9 
Adverse and Qualified 0 0 1 4 4 
Disclaimer and Qualified 0 0 0 1 1 
Unqualified 1,469 735 3,742 8,933 12,017 
Totala   (χ2 (3) = 31.8, p=0.00) 1,513 754 3,940 9,470 12,654 
 
a  Chi-square test compares unqualified opinions to the total of all other types of opinions. 
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Table 6 - Compliance with the Single Audit Act - The Impact of Size 
 
Size determined by median total federal awards and total 
assets, respectively 
Large 
Awards 
Small 
Awards  
 Large 
NPOs 
Small 
NPOs 
NPO Risk       
 Low Risk 3,775 3,565   3,931 3,409 
 Not Low Risk 2,552 2,762   2,396 2,918 
  Total 6,327 6,327   6,327 6,327 
Low Risk as Percentage of Total  59.67% 56.35%   62.13% 53.88% 
     (χ2(1) = 14.3, p=0.00)   (χ2(1) = 88.4, p=0.00) 
Financial Statement Opinion  (Organization as a whole)      
 Adverse  3 1   3 1 
 Disclaimer  4 15   7 12 
 Qualified  283 223   310 196 
 Unqualified  6,036 6,088   6,007 6,118 
Totala  6,327 6,327   6,327 6,327 
 (χ2(1) = 5.1, p=0.02)   (χ2(1) = 24.3, p=0.00) 
Going Concern Disclosed by Auditor       
 Number of audits  62 74   60 76 
 Percentage of audits 0.98% 1.17%   0.95% 1.20% 
 (χ2(1) = 1.1, p=0.30)   (χ2(1) = 3.0, p=0.09) 
Reportable Condition Disclosed by Auditor       
 Number of audits  863 1,124   987 1,000 
 Percentage of reports 13.64% 17.77%   15.60% 15.81% 
 (χ2(1) = 40.7, p=0.00)   (χ2(1) = 54.1 p=0.00) 
Reportable Conditions Considered a Material Weakness      
 Number of audits  248 331   273 306 
 Percentage of audits  3.92% 5.23%   4.31% 4.84% 
 Percentage of reportable conditions  28.74% 29.45%   27.66% 30.60% 
 (χ2(1) = 11.8, p=0.00)   (χ2(1) = 36.9, p=0.00) 
Material Noncompliance Disclosed by Auditor      
Number of audits  180 198   171 204 
Percentage of audits  2.84% 3.13%   2.70% 3.22% 
 (χ2(1) = 0.9, p=0.32)   (χ2(1) = 11.2, p=0.00) 
Type of Audit Report on Major Program Compliance      
 Adverse  7 3   8 2 
 Disclaimer  332 282   316 298 
 Qualified  2 7   3 6 
 Adverse and Qualified 2 2   2 2 
 Disclaimer and Qualified 1 0   1 0 
 Unqualified  5,983 6,033   5,997 6,019 
   Totalab 6,327 6,327   6,327 6,327 
 (χ2(1) = 4.1, p=0.04)   (χ2(1) = 0.8, p=0.37) 
 
a  Chi-square test compares unqualified opinions to the total of all other types of opinions 
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ENDNOTES 
                                                 
1 For example, the Internal Revenue Service has recently strengthened both the accessibility of nonprofit financial 
information and created intermediate sanctions that may be imposed without withdrawing tax-exempt status from a charitable 
organization.   
2 Freeman and Shoulders (2000) and Gross, Larkin and McCarthy (2000) provide a concise overview of the single 
audit act (Chapter 20 and Chapter 31, respectively).   
3 We first tried matching using the EIN and year, but this resulted in only 1,272 matched observations. The 
difference in the number of matches may be due to errors in the EIN field distributed in the 1999 Core File. 
4 NCCS’ “cleaning” includes checking (and correcting) mathematical errors and contacting organizations with 
obvious outliers (such as a report of zero assets by a university).  (Interview with NCCS staff, January 8, 2002). 
5  At the time of this study, the Big-5 accounting firms were  (listed alphabetically) Arthur Andersen, Deloitte & 
Touche, Ernst & Young, PriceWaterhouseCoopers, and KPMG.   
6 The full list of the 2001 Accounting Today top 100 firms was found on the Electronic Accountant web site at 
http://electronicaccountant.com/html/t100y2k/tocp3.htm. 
7 Governmental auditors performed only 15 audits (0.12% of total). These audits represent 15 auditees and 7 
auditors. 
8 The terminology used by auditors is somewhat confusing.  An unqualified opinion is the best and it is sometimes 
referred to as a “clean” opinion.  A qualified opinion indicates some reservations on the part of the auditor but not enough for 
an adverse opinion, that is, an opinion that the financial statements are not fairly stated or do not conform to GAAP.  A 
disclaimer means that the auditor did not express an opinion at all. 
9 A "reportable condition" is anything "including the identification of material weaknesses, identified as a result of 
the auditor's work in understanding and assessing the control risk during the audit." (OMB Circular A-133, A-5). 
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10 These criteria include audit findings in the previous period, length of time since the last audit, the life cycle of the 
federal program (first and last years may be higher risk), the auditor’s professional judgment of risk, and whether the OMB 
has made the program eligible for low-risk status.   
